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I. Introduction

This symposium primarily focuses on the extraordinary legal
and personal saga of one man, Joe Giarratano, his decades-long
heroic struggle to overturn his death sentence and, ultimately, to
obtain his release and exoneration. Prior to the conference, my only
acquaintance with the Giarratano case was the decision in Murray
v. Giarratano 1—the U.S. Supreme Court decision holding that the
Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel does not extend to
the post-conviction stages of death penalty litigation. 2 The
symposium provided a much broader perspective on the saga of Joe
Giarratano, whose own legal skills parallel those of the many
lawyers involved in his representation. My particular panel was
one focused on mental illness and the death penalty, which, as
other panelists made evident, was deeply implicated in the
Giarratano case as well. My participation in the panel, however,
was intended to offer a broader perspective on the issue, indeed the
only international law perspective on the array of issues discussed
during the symposium. This Article addresses the question of what
international human rights law has to say about the death penalty
in general, as well as the evolving views of the international
community as to how mental illness may, or should, bar the
imposition and carrying out of the death penalty.
Issues about mental illness and the death penalty remain
unresolved at the constitutional level in the United States, despite
a number of U.S. Supreme Court decisions addressing the topic, as
will be addressed below. 3 It is conservatively estimated that some
five to ten percent of all inmates on death row suffer from some
1. 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
2. Id. at 12.
3. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2746 (2015) (upholding the
particular controversial drug combination used to carry out executions in
Oklahoma and other states despite the appellant’s Eighth Amendment
challenge). See generally Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) (striking down
Florida’s rigid calculus of intellectual disability as a bar to execution); Panetti v.
Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (holding that a defendant must have a rational
understanding of the reason for his or her execution); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551 (2005) (prohibiting capital punishment for those under eighteen years of age
at the time of the offense); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (prohibiting the
death penalty for those with intellectual disabilities); Ford v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 399 (1986) (prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty against the
legally insane).
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form of mental illness. 4 In a book published in 2014, I predicted
that the next issue to be addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court—in
its gradual chipping away at the death penalty in the United
States—would be whether mental illness, other than insanity,
should bar the imposition of capital punishment under the Eighth
Amendment to the Constitution. 5 I am not alone in this
prediction. 6 Despite the death of Justice Antonin Scalia, and the
apparent impasse as to the Senate review and confirmation of his
successor, I continue to believe that the Court will soon take up
this important question.
The Court again addressed the contentious issue of lethal
injection as a method of execution in its 2015 decision Glossip v.
Gross 7—a decision more noteworthy for its dissents than its
majority opinion. In a far-reaching and exhaustive analysis,
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concluded that “the
death penalty, in and of itself, now likely constitutes a legally
prohibited ‘cruel and unusual punishmen[t].’” 8 That opinion
coincides with the arc of justice in the international community
where the law, standards, and practice bend strongly toward
abolition. 9 This Article will broadly examine the question of how
international human rights law looks at the death penalty
generally, as well as the context of those who are mentally ill on

4. See Position Statement 54: Death Penalty and People with Mental Illness,
MENTAL HEALTH AM., http://www.nmha.org/positions/death-penalty (last visited
Sept. 19, 2016) (noting the California Appellate Project’s estimate regarding the
mental health of death row inmates) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
5. See generally Richard J. Wilson, The Transformative Influence of
International Law and Practice on the Death Penalty in the United States, in
AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 157, 174–75 (James R. Acker,
Robert M. Bohm & Charles S. Lanier eds., 3d ed., 2014).
6. See generally Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court’s Evolving Death
Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe Mental Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C.L. REV.
785 (2009) (noting the U.S. Supreme Court’s movement toward barring the
imposition of the death penalty against those with a mental illness).
7. 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
8. Id. at 2756 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
9. It should be noted that capital punishment is legally permitted in narrow
circumstances within the international community. See, e.g., International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(noting the limits placed on the death penalty, but not banning it completely).
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death row. 10 The question arises from a consistent approach
adopted by the European Union and other countries, filing as amici
curiae in the U.S. Supreme Court, to express the views of the
international community to that tribunal. 11
This Article unfolds in six Parts. Part II briefly reviews the
state of the law on the death penalty and mental illness in the
United States today, largely through the lens of the jurisprudence
arising under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishments rather than a systematic study of practice in
the states. 12 Part III examines the state of the death penalty in
international human rights law today. 13 While the penalty is still
permitted under various human rights treaties, the strong and
worldwide trend is toward complete abolition of capital
punishment. 14 Part IV examines some of the methodological
difficulties in examining the practice of nations and international
bodies with regard to the death penalty and mental illness, 15 while
Part V summarizes the current views of the world community on
this important question. 16 Finally, Part VI provides brief
concluding remarks. 17
10. This Article will not address the complex legal question of whether
mentally ill defendants may be medicated to bring about a forced competency to
stand trial or to face execution in a drugged condition. There is virtually no data
on that issue at the international law level.
11. I appeared as counsel of record for the European Union and other
countries as amici curiae in the U.S. Supreme Court cases of Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (prohibiting the death penalty for those with intellectual
disabilities), and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (prohibiting capital
punishment for those under eighteen years of age at the time of the offense). In
each case, the views of the international community were relevant and persuasive
to the Court’s majorities.
12. See infra Part II (discussing case law surrounding competency to be
executed).
13. See infra Part III (discussing the global trend towards the abolition of
the death penalty).
14. Infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV (arguing that, while there may be significant
methodological difficulties in analyzing the use of the death penalty on a global
scale, the trend against execution of persons with mental illness is nonetheless
overwhelming).
16. See infra Part V (comparing two contemporaneous international law
norms regarding execution of persons with mental illnesses).
17. See infra Part VI (concluding that international law provides promising
alternatives through which the United States can more fully and specifically
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II. A Brief Review of U.S. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on the
Death Penalty and Mental Illness
If a defendant, due to a mental illness, is found incompetent
to stand trial or insane at the time of the offense, that defendant
obviously will not be sentenced to death. 18 He will be removed from
the judicial process for treatment and returned for trial only if
competence is regained. 19 If found to be insane at the time of the
offense, he will be remitted for treatment in custody. 20 Cases
involving the death penalty and mental illness have therefore
focused primarily on what is commonly referred to as “competence
to be executed,” and that is the focus of this Article. 21
The classic articulation of a rule—however rustic and
rudimentary—regarding the death penalty, mental illness, and
competence for execution came in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1986
decision in Ford v. Wainwright, 22 which held that “the Eighth
Amendment prohibits a State from carrying out a sentence of

define the range of severity of mental illness sufficient to bar the death penalty).
18. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409–10 (1986) (“[T]he Eighth
Amendment prohibits a State from carrying out a sentence of death upon a
prisoner who is insane.”).
19. In the landmark case of Dusky v. United States, the Supreme Court held,
in a brief per curium opinion, that for a defendant to be competent to stand trial,
he must have “a sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding” and a “rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.” 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). If not
competent, the defendant is to be hospitalized until he regains competency to
stand trial. Andrew D. Reisner et al., Competency to Stand Trial and Defendants
Who Lack Insight into Their Mental Illness, 41 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 85,
86 (2013) (“The topic of rationality is significant because it bears directly on the
ability of a defendant to assist legal counsel.”).
20. The paradigmatic case is that of John Hinckley Jr., who was acquitted
by reason of insanity in the shooting of President Ronald Reagan. See generally
Lincoln Caplan, The Insanity Defense, Post-Hinckley, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/18/opinion/18tue4.html?_r=0 (last visited Sept.
19, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The public was
outraged at the acquittal, but Hinckley remained in custody in a psychiatric ward,
with limited permission for family visits until recently. Id. Data suggest that the
defense is rarely invoked, and that defendants who use it are rarely acquitted on
that ground. Id.
21. John H. Blume et al., Killing the Oblivious: An Empirical Study of
Competency to be Executed Litigation, 79 UMKC L. REV. 1, 1 n.2 (2013).
22. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
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death upon a prisoner who is insane.” 23 The majority’s decision,
written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, was not a beacon of clarity.
It used the term “insanity” to describe a mental state as execution
approached; a condition not—in the traditional and narrow legal
meaning of insanity—limited to a state of mind of the defendant at
the time of the offense sufficient to excuse the offense. 24 Because of
this lack of clarity and precision, subsequent decisions on this issue
have tended to rely on the more detailed, if still imprecise,
concurrence by Justice Powell in Ford, who famously stated that
“the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of those who
are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why
they are to suffer it.” 25
A 2007 Supreme Court decision on this issue, Panetti v.
Quarterman, 26 provided much heat and little light on the topic of
competence for execution. There, the majority used due process
analysis to conclude that Scott Panetti had been denied the
opportunity to present evidence of his incompetence for
execution. 27 Panetti suffered from delusions that made him believe
that Texas wanted to execute him, not because he had committed
murder but because he was preaching the Gospel, according to the

23. Id. at 409–10.
24. See id. at 401–02 (noting that there was no suggestion that Ford was
incompetent at the time of the offense, but that his behavior gradually changed
following the offense).
25. Id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring). Further efforts to provide greater
definitional clarity have substituted the term “competence to be executed” for that
of “insanity” in carrying out the sentence. See Blume, supra note 21, at 1 n.2 (“The
Court [in Ford v. Wainwright] actually used the term ‘insane’ but it is in fact
competence that is the issue and post-Ford, it is ubiquitously referred to as
‘competency to be executed’ as opposed to ‘sanity to be executed.’”). This term, too,
suffers from a lack of precision, because “competence” is also a term of art
normally referring to the defendant’s ability to understand the proceedings and
assist his counsel so that he can stand trial for an offense. An incompetent
defendant’s trial can be postponed or avoided entirely if incompetence is
permanent. I will nonetheless adopt this terminology myself as the dominant
mode of discourse on the topic.
26. 551 U.S. 930 (2007).
27. See id. at 934–35 (“Under Ford [v. Wainwright], once a prisoner makes
the requisite preliminary showing that his current mental state would bar his
execution, the Eighth Amendment, applicable to the States under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, entitles him to an adjudication to
determine his condition.”).
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trial court’s own appointed experts. 28 In order to be competent for
execution, the Court held that the defendant must have “a rational
understanding of the reason for the execution.” 29 In the absence of
such an understanding due to his delusions, it was possible that
Panetti was not aware of the link between his crime and the
approaching execution. The Court found that “gross delusions
stemming from a severe mental disorder may put that awareness
in a context so far removed from reality that the punishment can
serve no proper purpose.” 30 The Court reversed and remanded the
case for further proceedings, which are ongoing as of this writing. 31
In its recent decisions, the closest the Justices have come to
the issue of mental illness as a bar to execution came in 2014, in
Hall v. Florida, 32 clarifying its 2002 judgment in Atkins v.
Virginia. 33 Atkins struck down the execution of persons with
intellectual disabilities—then referred to as “retardation”—as
cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. 34 In Hall, the
Court struck down Florida’s rigid calculus of intellectual disability
as a bar to execution. 35 Florida law required imposition of the
death penalty for anyone scoring above 70 on standard IQ tests. 36
The courts in Florida had interpreted this provision strictly,
finding that a person who scores higher than 70 is barred from
submitting further evidence regarding his mental faculties and is
eligible for the death penalty on grounds of mental state. 37 In
language that seems to apply with equal force to those with mental
illnesses, the Court found that “intellectual disability is a
condition, not a number,” and required that Florida consider
28. Panetti v. Dretke, 448 F.3d 815, 817–18 (5th Cir. 2006).
29. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 958.
30. Id. at 933.
31. Id. at 934. At the time of this writing, the Panetti case is pending review
on remand in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, under the name
Panetti v. Stephens. 586 Fed. Appx. 163 (5th Cir. Tex. 2014) (granting a stay of
execution). Oral argument was heard on September 23, 2015.
32. 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
33. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
34. Id. at 321.
35. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2001.
36. See id. at 1990 (“If, from test scores, a prisoner is deemed to have an IQ
above 70, all further exploration of intellectual disability is foreclosed.”).
37. See id. at 1992 (“The Florida Supreme Court rejected Hall’s appeal and
held that Florida’s 70-point threshold was constitutional.”).
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broader evidence of the disability. 38 The Court relied heavily on its
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence respecting “the dignity of all
persons,” looking to “evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society” for interpretation of what is cruel
and unusual. 39 This language, which resonates strongly in the
international law of human rights, looks to broad concepts such as
deterrence as a justification for capital punishment, and there Hall
holds that the Florida law falls short. 40 People with intellectual
disabilities are “likely unable to make the calculated judgments
that are the premise for the deterrence rationale.” 41 Such persons
have “‘diminished ability’ to ‘process information, to learn from
experience, to engage in logical reasoning, or to control impulses,’”
thus resulting in their inability to control their conduct or conform
it to the law. 42 It is but one small step from this rationale to a
similar one barring the execution of those suffering from mental
illnesses. 43
While the U.S. Supreme Court’s articulation of standards has
not been a model of clarity, the American Bar Association (ABA)
adopted a detailed resolution on mental illness and the death
penalty in 2006, which addresses exactly that lacuna. 44 The
resolution articulates an exemption from the death penalty for a
range of mental disabilities between those encompassed in the
38. Id. at 2001.
39. Id. at 1992.
40. Id. at 1993.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2009 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002)).
43. The National Mental Health Association reached this same conclusion
immediately after the decision in Atkins. See Ronald J. Tabak, Overview of the
Task Force Proposal on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty, 54 CATH. U.L.
REV. 1123, 1123 (2005) (“Within hours after the decision in Atkins was announced,
the National Mental Health Association stated that the same principles and
reasoning that Atkins applied to the mentally retarded were equally applicable to
many with mental illness, who the Association said should also be categorically
exempted from capital punishment.”).
44. See generally Symposium, Recommendations of the American Bar
Association Section on Individual Rights and Responsibilities Task Force on
Mental Disability and the Death Penalty, 54 CATH. U.L. REV. 1115, 1115–16 (2005)
[hereinafter Recommendations]. The recommendations were subsequently
adopted by the ABA House of Delegates as Recommendation 122A. See generally
BAR
ASS’N,
MENTAL
ILLNESS
RESOLUTION
(2006),
AM.
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/Death_Penalty_Rep
resentation/2006_am_122a.authcheckdam.pdf.
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vague “insanity” standard and the bar on execution of those with
intellectual disabilities, under the robust Hall standard. 45 The
drafters concluded that an exemption from the death penalty also
should apply to those persons whose mental disorders are
“functionally the same as mental retardation,” such as very serious
head injuries, or to persons with “such serious mental illness that
their culpability is as diminished as those with mental
retardation.” 46 “This lesser extent of culpability arises from such
effects of their mental illnesses as delusions, hallucinations,
significant thought disorders, and highly disorganized thinking.” 47
It would apply to those with “such disorders as schizophrenia and
psychosis.” 48 This typology is helpful in distinguishing the various
categories of mental illness and their legal consequences in the
context of capital punishment.
III. The Death Penalty in International Human Rights Law and
Practice: Toward Abolition
Justice Breyer, in his dissent in Glossip v. Gross, discussed
above, asserted that more than two-thirds of the world’s nations
(he counted 137 of the 193 countries of the world) have abolished
the death penalty as of the end of 2014. 49 While this data is
impressive, more recent statistics suggest an even more aggressive
pattern of abolition. 50 In August 2014, Ban Ki-moon, the U.N.
Secretary General, documented “approximately 160 of the 193
Member States” of the United Nations as having abolished the
death penalty or having adopted a moratorium on its use in any
45. See generally Recommendations, supra note 44; see also Hall v. Florida,
134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014) (discussing Florida courts’ use of IQ scores to
determine eligibility for the death penalty).
46. Tabak, supra note 43, at 1127–28.
47. Id. at 1128.
48. Id.
49. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2775 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I
note, however, that many nations—indeed, 95 of the 193 members of the United
Nations—have formally abolished the death penalty and an additional 42 have
abolished it in practice.”).
50. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 67/176, Moratorium on the Use of the Death Penalty,
at ¶ 8 (Dec. 20, 2012) (noting the growing number of countries moving away from
the death penalty).
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circumstance. 51 That is more than eighty percent of the world’s
nations. 52 The worldwide trend is moving rapidly toward
abolition. 53
In December 2014, the U.N. General Assembly passed its fifth
resolution—the first of which was adopted in 2007—calling for all
retentionist countries to adopt a moratorium on the death penalty,
and for those countries that continue to apply it, not to impose a
sentence of death “on persons with mental or intellectual
disabilities.” 54 Within the United Nations, opposition to the death
penalty is widespread, with growing agitation for abolition from
several fronts. 55 The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights
has convened high-level panels on the question of the death
penalty between 2012 and 2015. 56 The last of these panels, in July
2015, formally emphasized “the international community’s
responsibility to move towards universal abolition of the death
penalty.” 57 The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
51. U.N. Secretary-General, Moratorium on the Use of the Death Penalty,
¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/69/288 (Aug. 8, 2014). While no sources are offered for that
statistic in his report, a report from an international watchdog group on the death
penalty supports the tally. See Country Status on the Death Penalty, HANDS OFF
CAIN, http://www.handsoffcain.info/bancadati/index.php?tipotema=arg&idtema=
20000702 (last visited Sept. 19, 2016) (documenting 161 countries as abolitionist
in law or practice, with thirty-seven retentionist countries) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
52. Country Status on the Death Penalty, supra note 51.
53. See id. (noting the growing number of countries moving away from the
death penalty); G.A. Res. 67/176, supra note 50, at ¶ 8 (same).
54. G.A. Res. 69/186, ¶ 5(d) (Feb. 4, 2015). The vote was 117 in favor of the
resolution, 38 against (including the United States), and 34 abstentions.
AMNESTY INT’L, DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS: 2014 (2015),
http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/DeathSentencesAndExecutions2014_EN.pdf.
55. See generally U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS GLOB. PANEL,
MOVING AWAY FROM THE DEATH PENALTY: ARGUMENTS, TRENDS, AND PERSPECTIVES
(2014), http://www.ohchr.org/Lists/MeetingsNY/Attachments/52/ Moving-Awayfrom-the-Death-Penalty.pdf [hereinafter Arguments, Trends, and Perspectives]
(discussing the growing opposition to the death penalty throughout the
international community); U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS GLOB. PANEL,
MOVING AWAY FROM THE DEATH PENALTY: LESSONS FROM NATIONAL EXPERIENCES
(2012),
http://www.ohchr.org/Lists/MeetingsNY/Attachments/27/
moving_away_from_death_penalty_web.pdf [hereinafter Lessons from National
Experience] (same).
56. See generally Arguments, Trends, and Perspectives, supra note 55;
Lessons from National Experience, supra note 55.
57. U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, High-Level Panel
Discussion on the Question of the Death Penalty, at ¶ 45, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/21
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Summary or Arbitrary Executions 58 and the Special Rapporteur on
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 59
support a moratorium or abolition of the death penalty,
respectively. 60 The Special Rapporteur on Torture explicitly
extends his recommendation on abolition to those “persons with
mental disabilities.” 61 Finally, in his 2012 report to the U.N.
General Assembly, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions notes that, in addition to calls
from the General Assembly, a moratorium on the death penalty
has been issued by “the Council of Europe, the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights and, in August 2012, the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights.” 62 Globally and
regionally, calls for moratoria and abolition are on the rise.
The twenty-eight countries of the European Union have a
combined population of over 503 million persons, making it the
third largest world population after China and India. 63 The death
penalty has been abolished for all purposes within the Union. 64 All
E.U. Member States are also members of the larger Council of
Europe, with a total of forty-seven countries 65 and a combined
(July 16, 2015).
58. See U.N. Secretary-General, Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, ¶ 118, U.N. Doc. A/67/275 (Aug. 9, 2012) (calling for a moratorium in
retentionist states).
59. See U.N. Secretary-General, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, ¶ 74–75, U.N. Doc.
A/67/269 (Aug. 9, 2012) (finding that the prohibition on torture may bar the death
penalty as a developing norm of customary international law).
60. Id.; Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, supra note 58.
61. Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, supra note 59, at ¶ 80(a).
62. Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, supra note 58, at ¶ 22.
63. Living in the EU, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/factsfigures/living/index_en.htm (last updated Sept. 19, 2016) (last visited Sept. 19,
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
64. Background: The Death Penalty and the EU’s Policy on Its Abolition,
EUROPEAN UNION, https://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/adp/docs/death_penalty_
background_en.pdf.
65. EU Member Countries, EU, https://europa.eu/european-union/abouteu/countries/member-countries_en (last visited Sept. 19, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Member countries include: Albania, Andorra,
Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia,
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population of some 820 million persons. 66 Membership in the
Council of Europe, in turn, is conditioned on the abolition of, or a
moratorium on, the death penalty, including Protocols 6 and 13 to
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”), which together abolish the
death penalty in all circumstances. 67
The European Court of Human Rights applies the ECHR. 68 In
2010, the court decided a case involving two Iraqi nationals held in
British custody who faced the death penalty if turned over to the
national courts of Iraq. 69 The court took as its starting point the
following formulation regarding the death penalty:
Judicial execution involves the deliberate and premeditated
destruction of a human being by the State authorities.
Whatever the method of execution, the extinction of life involves
some physical pain. In addition, the foreknowledge of death at
the hands of the State must inevitably give rise to intense
psychological suffering. The fact that the imposition and use of
the death penalty negates fundamental human rights has been
recognised by the member States of the Council of Europe. 70

The court went on to find that the applicants’ “well-founded fear”
of being executed by Iraqi courts “must have given rise to a
significant degree of mental suffering,” thus violating Article 3 of
the ECHR, which prohibits torture and inhumane or degrading

Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San
Marino, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United
Kingdom. Id.
66. Living in the EU, supra note 63.
67. EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS 38, 52 (2010) http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
Convention_ENG.pdf. All countries save Russia have ratified Protocol 6, and
Russia has adopted a de facto moratorium since 1999. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note
54, at 65 n.173. The same is true for Protocol 13, which also has not been ratified
by Armenia and Azerbaijan, but where a moratorium is in effect in both countries.
Id. at 67.
68. Id.
69. Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, App. No. 61498/08, Eur. Ct.
H.R., ¶ 120 (Apr. 10, 2010).
70. Id. at ¶ 120.
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treatment or punishment. 71 The individuals in question could not
be surrendered to face a sentence of death without violation of the
ECHR. 72 That ECHR standard is similar to the prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishments in the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth
Amendment. 73 Moreover, the European Court has recognized and
approved the practice of requiring that the United States and other
retentionist countries provide diplomatic assurances against the
death penalty prior to allowing the extradition of a Council of
Europe national to that country, thus further limiting the death
penalty in the United States. 74
This widespread movement of the world community toward
abolition of the death penalty suggests that the United States
should follow that trend, if not through legislation, then through
brave and courageous positions such as those expressed by Justices
Breyer and Ginsburg in their joint Glossip dissent. 75 The death
penalty itself is cruel and unusual, as the Eighth Amendment is
understood in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.
IV. Some Methodological Challenges in Documentation of Mental
Illness and Death Penalty Issues in International Law
There are three basic challenges to the documentation of
issues regarding the more limited issue of imposition of the death
penalty for those with mental illness. First, the death penalty itself
is severely limited, but still permitted, under international
treaties, global and regional. While detailed constraints on the
penalty are articulated in the treaties, none of them explicitly
creates an exception for the execution of persons with mental
71. Id. at ¶ 137.
72. See EU Policy on Death Penalty, supra note 64 (stating that cruel and
inhumane treatment violates the ECHR).
73. Compare EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, supra note 67, with U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
74. See, e.g., Rrapo v. Albania, App. No. 58555/10, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 73 (Sept.
25, 2012) (finding that diplomatic assurances from the United States to the
Albanian government, barring the application of the death penalty, were
adequate to permit extradition of the applicant to the United States).
75. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2756 (2015) (Breyer, J. dissenting)
(concluding that “the death penalty, in and of itself, now likely constitutes a
legally prohibited ‘cruel and unusual punishmen[t]’”).
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illness. Second, terms of reference differ widely, and cultural and
legal practice varies extremely widely among countries. Third,
information on the death penalty and mental illness is not easily
available from national reports to U.N. treaty bodies, as is often
the case with other data on human rights compliance. I will discuss
each of these issues in turn, then argue in Part IV that the trend
against execution of persons with mental illness is nonetheless
overwhelming.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), a global human rights treaty to which the United States
is a party, 76 is typical of the treaties limiting the death penalty. It
includes a provision, in Article 6, regarding the right to life. 77
Within the treaty, that right is qualified as to the application of the
death penalty. 78 The relevant language reads as follows:
Article 6
1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right
shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived
of his life.
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty,
sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious
crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the
commission of the crime. . . . This penalty can only be carried
out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court.
....
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek
pardon or commutation of the sentence.
Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may
be granted in all cases.
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed
by persons below eighteen years of age and shall not be carried
out on pregnant women.

76. For reports regarding United States compliance with its human rights
treaty obligations, see U.S. Treaty Reports, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/reports/treaties/index.htm#ftn2 (last visited Sept. 19,
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
77. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, supra note 9.
78. Id.
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6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent
the abolition of capital punishment by any State Party to the
present Covenant. 79

The Human Rights Committee—which oversees compliance
with the ICCPR—issues General Comments regarding treaty
interpretation based on its experience with the treaty. The
Committee has commented on the death penalty language in the
treaty on only one occasion, in its General Comment 6, issued in
1982. 80 There, it states that Article 6 “refers generally to abolition
in terms which strongly suggest . . . that abolition is desirable.” 81
The Committee also states that “the expression ‘most serious
crimes’ must be read restrictively to mean that the death penalty
should be a quite exceptional measure.” 82 The treaty itself
articulates only two groups for whom execution is explicitly barred:
persons below eighteen years of age and pregnant women. 83 That
explicit exception came into play, for example, in the case of Roper
v. Simmons, 84 which struck down the death penalty for those
minors under eighteen at the time of their offenses. 85 No language
appears on the face of this treaty or any other international human
rights treaty that explicitly addresses or prohibits the execution of
persons with intellectual or mental disabilities. Other sources have
to suffice. As the next Part shows, they are ample.
The second limiting issue is that of consistency of terminology
and cultural or legal limitations on proper medical diagnosis
around the world. Examples that appear in the reported cases use
a staggering variety of terms for mental illness itself, and hardly
ever with medical precision: “madness,” “impairment of mind” or
“cognitive impairment,” “disorder,” “handicap,” “abnormality,” and
“disability” provide just a few examples. 86 Often, issues of limited
79. Id.
80. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Comment
6 (1982), at ¶¶ 6, 7.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, supra note 9.
84. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
85. Id. at 568 (“A majority of States have rejected the imposition of the death
penalty on juvenile offenders under 18, and we now hold this is required by the
Eighth Amendment.”).
86. See, e.g., id. at 573 (“disorder”); Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990
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intellectual capacity (associated with lower IQ scores) are
conflated with those of mental illness in reports or judicial
decisions. 87 Achieving an accurate medical and psychiatric
assessment of the accused or convicted capital defendant, whether
on trial or in prison, is often difficult in many countries. 88 The U.N.
Secretary General himself noted this in his 2009 periodic report to
the General Assembly regarding capital punishment. 89 There, he
reviewed the standards for imposition of the death penalty, noting
that what was then called the U.N. Human Rights Commission
had called for U.N. member states “not to impose capital
punishment on or to execute ‘a person suffering from any mental
or intellectual disabilities.’” 90 His seemingly frustrated response
states:
Whereas with juvenile offenders or pregnant women, the
determination that a person belongs to the protected category
is relatively straightforward, there is an enormous degree of
subjectivity involved when assessing such concepts as insanity,
limited mental competence and “any form of mental disorder.”
The expression “any form of mental disorder” probably applies
to a large number of people sentenced to death. 91

Finally, there are simple issues regarding lack of accurate
reporting on state practice. In its widespread reforms of 2007, the
United Nations redesigned a number of processes regarding
human rights reporting. 92 The Human Rights Commission was
abolished and replaced by a new Human Rights Council and the
new Council was charged with administration of a process called
Universal Periodic Review (UPR), which requires that all member
states of the United Nations submit a periodic report regarding
their compliance with human rights norms, regardless of the

(2014) (“disability”); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 407 (1986) (“madness”).
87. See, e.g., Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1990 (discussing Florida courts’ use of IQ
scores to determine eligibility for the death penalty).
88. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, Capital Punishment and
Implementation of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those
Facing the Death Penalty, ¶ 93, U.N. Doc. E/2010/10 (Dec. 18, 2009).
89. Id.
90. Id. at ¶ 90.
91. Id. at ¶ 93.
92. See generally G.A. Res. 5/1 (June 18, 2007).
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formal instruments adopted by that nation. 93 In his first report
after the adoption of the UPR process, the U.N. Secretary General
again expressed his frustration to the General Assembly in his
ninth quinquennial report on the death penalty of 2015. 94 He
concluded: “There is virtually no information on [execution of
persons with mental disabilities] in the replies to the
questionnaires, in the materials generated by the universal
periodic review process or in the work of the treaty bodies.” 95 While
the conclusions of the Secretary General parallel those of the
author’s own research on U.N. treaty and universal periodic review
reports, the body of jurisprudence on this issue—as the next Part
documents—is robust and conclusive. The death penalty is
inappropriate for those suffering from mental illness. The question
is one of the degree and specificity of the illness to justify the bar.
V. The Evolving Jurisprudence on the Death Penalty and Mental
Illness Under International Human Rights Law
The bar on execution of the insane long predates the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Ford v. Wainwright. 96 In the late
eighteenth century, Sir Edward Coke, the great English jurist, said
that “by intendment of law the execution of the offender is for
example . . . but so it is not when a mad man is executed, but
should be a miserable spectacle, both against law, and of extreme
inhumanity and cruelty, and can be no example to others.” 97 Coke
spoke of those prisoners who were found not to be legally insane at
the time of trial, but became “mad” as execution approached. 98 The
passage from Coke’s Institutes is repeated in Justice Marshall’s
opinion in Ford, which notes, from the very outset, its debt to the
history of the common law on execution of the “insane:” “For
93. Id. at § I.
94. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, Capital Punishment and
Implementation of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those
Facing the Death Penalty, ¶ 86, U.N. Doc. E/2015/49 (July 21–22, 2015).
95. Id.
96. EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 6 (1797).
97. Id.
98. Id.
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centuries no jurisdiction has countenanced the execution of the
insane, yet this Court has never decided whether the Constitution
forbids the practice. Today we keep faith with our common-law
heritage in holding that it does.” 99
As early as 1962, scholars in the United States had concluded
that under the common law and, “as far as we know, the law of all
civilized nations, a person who is insane cannot be punished.” 100
Later in the same article, the authors made their finding more
precise: “for practical purposes we can think of the rule [on
insanity] in its common law form as an exemption from capital
punishment.” 101 While these scholars provided no data to support
their conclusion, later scholars have reached the same conclusion
through careful analysis of international law and practice. 102 Some
empirical support for that conclusion is found in the first report of
the United Nations on the death penalty, conducted in the early
1960s. 103 That study, which surveyed all U.N. member countries,
noted:
Under the law of some countries, a person may not be executed
if he is insane, whether at the time of the sentence or at the time
when it is to be carried out; this is the case, for example, in the
Central African Republic, China, Iraq, Greece and
Yugoslavia. 104

There was enough conclusive evidence of the widespread bar by
2002 that Professor William Schabas, in his definitive book on
abolition of the death penalty in international law, concluded that
it is “a norm of customary law that the insane may not be
executed.” 105
The recently adopted UN Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities (“CRPD”)—signed but not ratified by the United
States—does not address the precise question of the use of capital
99. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 401 (1986) (emphasis added).
100. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & David W. Louisell, Death, the State, and the
Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 UCLA L. REV. 381, 381 (1962).
101. Id. at 382.
102. See, e.g., Marc Ancel, Capital Punishment, ¶ 71, U.N. Doc. ST/SOA/SD/9
(1962).
103. See generally id.
104. Id.
105. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 375 (3d ed. 2002).
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punishment on persons with mental illness; it does, however,
provide some definitional guidance that can be helpful here. 106 The
CRPD includes, in the category of persons with disabilities, “those
who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory
impairments which in interaction with various barriers may
hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal
basis with others.” 107 Similarly, the regional treaty of the Americas
on persons with disabilities defines “disability” as “a physical,
mental, or sensory impairment, whether permanent or temporary,
that limits the capacity to perform one or more essential activities
of daily life, and which can be caused or aggravated by the
economic and social environment.” 108 Notably, in neither treaty is
a distinction made between mental illness and intellectual
disability, and the term “mental illness” is not used; “mental
impairment” is the chosen referent. 109
Another baseline of international law for the treatment of
mentally ill prisoners in general can be found in the United
Nations’ Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners. 110 These baseline rules were adopted sixty years ago by
the First U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Prisoners, held in 1995, and were subsequently
approved by the U.N. Economic and Social Council (“ECOSOC”) in
1957 and again, with revisions, in 1977. 111 Of particular relevance
is Standard 22(1), which recommends that every prison “include a
106. See generally Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art.
1, Mar. 30, 2007, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3.
107. Id.
108. Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities art. 1, June 8, 1999, AG/RES.
1608 (XXIX-O/99). The treaty entered into force on September 14, 2001, and has
nineteen states parties at present. Inter-American Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, OAS,
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-65.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2016) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The United States has not signed
the treaty. Id.
109. See Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, supra note 108, art. 1 (noting
the use of the term “mental impairment” throughout the treaty); Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 106, at 3 (same).
110. See generally Economic and Social Council Res. 663 C (XXIV) (July 31,
1957), Res. 2076 (LXII) (May 13, 1977).
111. Id.
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psychiatric service for the diagnosis and, in proper cases, the
treatment of states of mental abnormality.” 112 Standards 24 and
25 govern the examination, treatment and rehabilitation of
mentally impaired individuals. 113 Standard 24 mandates
examination by a medical officer “as soon as possible after his
admission and thereafter as necessary,” and documentation of
“mental defects which might hamper rehabilitation.” 114 Finally,
Standard 25 sets out rigorous standards requiring that the medical
officer report to the prison director when a prisoner’s mental
health “has been or will be injuriously affected by continued
imprisonment or by any condition of imprisonment.” 115 The
director is admonished to “take immediate steps to give effect to
those recommendations,” or to seek assistance from higher
authorities to do so. 116 The Standard Minimum Rules, as now
written, do not address the question of the execution of the insane
or mentally impaired individual. 117
The question remains, therefore, as to what international
human rights law has to say about the prisoner awaiting execution
who is not legally insane, but who suffers from some form of mental
illness or impairment. Two distinct lines of authority have
developed, one which argues that any mental illness should
exempt the defendant from execution, 118 while another argues that
only certain serious or severe mental illnesses should bar the death
penalty. 119 I will address each of these lines of authority separately
in the following subsections.

112. Id. at 22(1).
113. Id. at 24, 25.
114. Id. at 24.
115. Id. at 25.
116. Id. at 26(2).
117. See G.A. Res. 70/175 (Dec. 17, 2015) (noting that the new U.N. Standard
Minimum Rules have been renamed as the Nelson Mandela Rules).
118. Supra Part V.A.
119. Supra Part V.B.
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A. Support for a Ban on Execution of Persons with Any Mental
Impairment
This line of authority appears to have emerged from the strong
advocacy of the European Union within the United Nations and its
influence on the development of international policies within the
United Nations and other bodies. 120 The E.U. policy on the death
penalty and mental illness is set out fully in the E.U. Council’s
guidelines on the death penalty. 121 There, the Council sets out
minimum standards for those countries that retain the death
penalty, in Section III. 122 Subsection (iv) in that section states that
capital punishment “shall not be imposed on . . . persons suffering
from any mental illness or having an intellectual disability.” 123 The
term “mental illness” is not defined in the guidelines, although it
is distinguished from intellectual disabilities, so more general
definitions such as those discussed above must be applied.
Beginning in 2000, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights,
then the principal deliberative body of the United Nations on
human rights issues, adopted annual resolutions specifically
addressing the question of the execution of those with mental
illness. 124 The resolutions consistently call on states “[n]ot to
impose the death penalty on a person suffering from any form of
mental disorder or to execute any such person.” 125 Similar
resolutions containing identical language were passed each year
until the year before the Commission was abolished and replaced
by the newly reformed U.N. Human Rights Council in 2006. 126
There is no evidence that the resolutions of the Commission were
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, at least as to the “any
120. See generally Council Common Guidelines on Death Penalty (EU) No.
8416/13 Annex of 12 Apr. 2013, at 5, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document
/ST-8416-2013-INIT/en/pdf (stating the European Union’s policy on the death
penalty).
121. Id.
122. See id. § 3 (“While continuing to state its strong opposition to the death
penalty and advocate for its full abolition, the EU shall insist that those countries
that still maintain executions respect the following minimum standards . . . .).
123. Id. § 3(iv) (emphasis added).
124. C.H.R. Res. 2000/65 (Apr. 26, 2000). The United States voted against the
resolution each year.
125. Id. § 3(e).
126. Each resolution contained virtually identical language. Id.

1490

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1469 (2016)

form” language. However, it should be noted that the United
Nations’ resolutions on the death penalty, adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly from 2007—the year after the last Commission
resolution—through 2015, use generic language admonishing
retentionist countries not to impose a sentence of death “on persons
with mental or intellectual disabilities.” 127 The gravity or severity
of the mental disability is not specified and can therefore be read
to be general and inclusive of any such disability, if the resolutions
are to be read consistently with prior action within U.N. bodies.
Support for the “any mental illness” position is also found in
two important death penalty decisions affecting multiple
individuals, one from the Commission on Human Rights and the
other from the Supreme Court of India. Each applies the “any
mental illness” standard as a limitation on execution of the
mentally ill death row inmate. 128
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR”
or “Commission”) is a principal and autonomous human rights
body representing the thirty-five countries making up the
Organization of American States, including the United States. 129
During its long tenure, but particularly in the last twenty years, it
has expressed growing concerns about the death penalty in the
hemisphere. 130 In 2011, the Commission produced a significant
report calling for a moratorium on the death penalty “as a step
toward the gradual disappearance of this penalty.” 131 Moreover, in
connection with its adoption of the regional convention on
disability rights, discussed above, the IACHR adopted a specific
recommendation calling on member states of the Organization of
American States to establish laws that “guarantee respect for the
127. G.A. Res. 69/186 (Dec. 18, 2014).
128. See infra pp. 1489–93 (providing the “any mental illness” position used
by the IACHR and the Supreme Court of India).
129. See generally What Is the IACHR?, OAS, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/
mandate/what.asp (last visited Sept. 19, 2016) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
130. See, e.g., 25 Years After the Adoption of the Protocol, the IACHR Urges
States to Abolish the Death Penalty or Take Steps Toward its Abolition, OAS (June
8, 2015), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2015/062. asp (last
visited Sept. 19, 2016) (noting the organization’s efforts to abolish the death
penalty) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
131. Inter-Am. C.H.R., The Death Penalty in the Inter-American System: From
Restrictions to Abolition, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, doc. 68 rev. ¶ 143 (Dec. 31, 2011).
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fundamental freedoms and human rights of persons with mental
disability . . . incorporating international standards and the
provisions of human rights conventions that protect the mentally
ill.” 132
One of the most significant international cases on capital
punishment in recent years comes from the IACHR and involves
the application of the death penalty in the United States. In 2013,
the Commission decided the case of Lackey v. United States. 133 In
Lackey, the Commission took the unusual step of consolidating the
cases of sixteen separate defendants in death penalty cases who
had petitioned the system, arising from convictions in six different
states: North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Missouri, Texas,
and Utah. 134 By the time the Commission decided the case, six
individuals had been executed, despite a request by the
Commission that the U.S. government take precautionary
measures to assure that executions not be carried out while the
cases were pending at the IACHR. 135 The Commission focused its
attention on a group of five claims common to all of the cases, one
of which is relevant to the discussion here: mental illness as a bar
to execution. 136 The Commission found that five of the petitioning
inmates suffered from mental disorders of varying degrees of
severity. 137

132. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Recommendation of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of the Mentally
Ill, OAS/Ser L/V/II.111 doc. 20 rev. ¶ 3 (Apr. 4, 2011).
133. See generally Cases 11.575, 12.333 & 12.341, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report
No. 52/13 (2013).
134. Id.
135. Id. at ¶ 1.
136. Id.
137. Two of the inmates, David Leisure and James Wilson Chambers, were
found to have mental disabilities associated with low IQ, and are not discussed
here, although the violations recognized by the Commission applied equally to
them. Id. The five inmates with mental disorders, and the state in which they
were convicted, were James Brown of Georgia (paranoid schizophrenia, acute
psychosis with visual and audio hallucinations); Id. at ¶ 28; Robert Karl Hicks of
Georgia (microcephaly with frontal lobe dysfunction); Id. at ¶ 39; Troy Albert
Kunkle of Texas (schizophrenia and serious childhood abuse); Id. at ¶ 45; Jaime
Elizalde Jr. of Texas (unspecified mental disorder not raised timely by defense
counsel); Id. at ¶ 59; and Angel Maturino Resendiz of Texas (schizophrenia,
hallucinations and self-mutilation). Id. at ¶ 63.
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At the beginning of the discussion on mental disorders and the
death penalty, the Commission stated the following:
It is a principle of international law that persons with mental
disabilities, either at the time of the commission of the crime or
during trial, cannot be sentenced to the death penalty.
Likewise, international law also prohibits execution of a person
sentenced to death if that person has a mental disability at the
time of execution. 138

The Commission then cites, with approval, the recommendation of
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, referred to above, which,
it notes, “called upon all States that still have the death penalty
‘[n]ot to impose the death penalty on a person suffering from any
mental or intellectual disabilities or to execute any such
person.’” 139 The IACHR found violations of the right to life and to
protection against “cruel, infamous or unusual punishment,”
language that comes from the American Declaration on the Rights
and Duties of Man, to which the Commission has repeatedly found
that the United States is bound. 140 Their conclusion on the issue
reads as follows:
As the right to life is the ultimate right, and given the
heightened degree of scrutiny required in capital cases, the
Inter-American Commission considers that persons with mental
disability cannot be subjected to capital punishment, as these
individuals are unable to comprehend the reason for or
consequence of their execution. 141

The Commission does not qualify “mental disability” in any way,
although the facts in the cases before it suggest certain gravity in
the illnesses of the designated death row inmates. 142
Other cases involving the death penalty and mental illness are
in the process of resolution and reflect the serious attention to be
given by the Commission to the issue of mental illness and the
death penalty. They include an admissibility decision—a decision
to hear the merits of a petition—from a death row inmate in
138. Id. at ¶ 213.
139. Id. at ¶ 214.
140. Id. at ¶ 220.
141. Id. at ¶ 218 (emphasis added).
142. See id. (listing various mental illnesses involved in cases before the
Commission).
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Tennessee who exhibits severe mental illness, 143 and the issuance
of two requests in 2014 for precautionary measures to the U.S.
government to prevent executions while the cases are pending
before the Commission. The first case arises in Ohio, where the
condemned defendant exhibits significant brain damage and other
mental illness, 144 and the other in Arizona, where the defendant
alleges “crippling mental illness” and traumatic brain injury. 145
Similar to the Commission, the Indian Supreme Court dealt
with a consolidated case involving twelve petitioners convicted of
capital crimes, all of whom had extended stays on death row. 146
There, the unanimous court commuted the death sentences of two
men treated for “chronic psychotic illnesses.” 147 In support of its
legal conclusion, the court relied primarily on the standard
articulated in the 2005 resolution of the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights, which, as the previous resolutions had, called on
“all States that still maintain the death penalty . . . not to impose
the death penalty on a person suffering from any form of mental
disorder or to execute any such person.”148
Here, then, we have U.N. bodies repeatedly adopting the “any
mental illness” formulation of the European Union over a number
of years, as well as the IACHR and the highest court of India.
Support for that formulation is extensive.

143. See Thompson v. United States, Case 194-04, Report No. 132/11, at 2,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. (2011) (noting that Mr. Thompson was allegedly “diagnosed
with bipolar affective disorder, schizo-affective disorder, and schizophrenia”).
144. See generally Moreland v. United States, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Resolution No. 32/2014, Precautionary Measure No. 37-14 (2014).
145. Rogovich v. United States, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Resolution No.
4/2014, Precautionary Measure No. 57-14 (Mar. 4, 2014).
146. Shatrughan Chauan v. Union of India (2014) 3 SCC 1 (India).
147. Id. at ¶ 71.
148. Id. at ¶ 73. The court concluded that “[i]n view of the well-established
laws both at national as well as international sphere, we are inclined to consider
insanity as one of the supervening circumstances that warrants for commutation
of death sentence to life imprisonment.” Id. at ¶ 79.
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B. Support for a Ban on Execution of Persons with Severe Mental
Impairment
The primary articulation of a standard regarding the
limitation on execution of persons with severe or serious mental
illness is found in the American Bar Association’s 2006
recommendation, discussed above. 149 Some U.N. standards and
recommendations articulate a measure of gravity of the mental
illness when calling on countries to end the practice of the death
penalty for those with mental illness. Those sources are examined
below.
In the 1980s, the U.N. Economic and Social Council adopted
safeguards concerning the application of the death penalty. 150 The
earliest version of the Safeguards called for prohibition of the
execution of “persons who have become insane,” thus contributing
to the worldwide consensus on execution of the insane discussed
earlier in this article. 151 The Safeguards were endorsed by the U.N.
General Assembly in the same year. 152 In 1988, the Safeguards
were updated and made more specific, admonishing states where
the death penalty was not in force to eliminate the death penalty
“for persons suffering from mental retardation or extremely
limited mental competence, whether at the stage of sentence or
execution.” 153 The resolution was adopted without a vote. 154 It
articulates a relatively high bar of “extremely limited” competence,
which I read to mean a severe level of mental illness. 155
The language regarding the execution stage in both versions
of the Safeguards makes clear that the United Nations was
attempting to deal with ongoing mental illness and not sanity at
the time of the offense, or competency at the time of trial. This is
149. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 44.
150. See Economic and Social Council Res. 1984/50, Safeguards Guaranteeing
Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty (1984) (providing the
first iteration).
151. Id. at ¶ 3. See generally supra Part III.
152. See G.A. Res. 39/118, ¶ 2, Human Rights in the Administration of Justice
(1984) (endorsing “the recommendations contained in Economic and Social
Council resolutions 1984/47 and 1984/50 on procedures . . . and safeguards
guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty”).
153. Economic and Social Council Res. 1989/64, ¶ 1(d) (1989).
154. SCHABAS, supra note 105, at 173 n.155.
155. Economic and Social Council Res. 1989/64, ¶ 1(d) (1989).
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borne out by the 2010 report of the U.N. Secretary General, who
concluded that:
The norm protecting insane and mentally disabled persons from
execution applies even when there is no question of competency
at the time the crime was committed or at trial. It is not
uncommon for a person to become insane subsequent to
conviction and sentence of death, and in such cases execution is
forbidden by the third safeguard. 156

The Safeguards have been widely endorsed by other U.N.
bodies in subsequent reporting. For example, in his 2000 report to
the General Assembly, the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions commented in
detail as follows:
The Special Rapporteur wishes to stress that in resolution
1989/64 the Economic and Social Council also recommended
that States strengthen the protection of the rights of those
facing the death penalty by eliminating the death penalty for
persons suffering from mental handicap or extremely limited
mental capacity. Moreover, the Safeguards guaranteeing
protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty
stipulate that the death penalty shall not be carried out on
persons who have become insane. The Special Rapporteur
strongly supports these recommendations and urges States to
take action to reflect these restrictions in domestic law. 157

In its concluding observations to the report of the United
States under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, submitted in 2006, the Human Rights Committee
welcomed the decision by the Supreme Court in Atkins v. Virginia,
and encouraged the United States “to ensure that persons
suffering from severe forms of mental illness not amounting to
mental retardation are equally protected.” 158 Here, the Committee

156. U.N. Secretary-General, Capital Punishment and the Implementation of
the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death
Penalty, ¶ 91, U.N. Doc. E/2010/10 (Dec. 18, 2009).
157. Comm’n on H.R., Econ. & Soc. Council, Civil and Political Rights,
Including Questions of Disappearances and Summary Executions, ¶ 69, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/2000/2 (Jan. 25, 2000) (emphasis added).
158. H.R. Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee:
United States of America, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev. 1 (Dec. 18,
2006) (emphasis added).
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adopts language similar to that of the ABA recommendation on
mental illness and the death penalty. 159
International human rights bodies, as well as national courts,
have addressed the question of mental illness of death row
prisoners. Their results uniformly require or call for elimination of
the death sentence and recognition of the need for treatment of the
affected prisoner. Examples come primarily from the deliberations
of the Human Rights Committee, which oversees individual
complaints under the First Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and state practice in the
Caribbean and Japan.
In 1994, the Human Rights Committee decided Francis v.
Jamaica, 160 one of the first international cases to raise the issue of
mental illness and capital punishment. Over the course of more
than a decade on death row, many years of which were spent in
solitary confinement, Mr. Francis’ defense counsel and a prison
chaplain noticed deterioration in his mental state. 161 He was
reported to have “a high level of cognitive impairment” as well as
“general mental disturbance and paranoia.” 162 While the
government was said to have examined the prisoner, no results
were made public or shared with the Committee. 163 Petitioner’s
counsel cited to both the 1984 and 1989 versions of the ECOSOC
Resolutions cited here. 164 The Committee found that the
petitioner’s “mental health seriously deteriorated during
incarceration on death row.” 165 It found violations of the
prohibition on cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment (Art. 7),
and the requirement of humane treatment when deprived of
liberty (Art. 10.1), 166 and requested the government to provide

159. See Recommendations, supra note 44 and accompanying text (explaining
the standard used by the ABA).
160. Francis v. Jamaica, H.R. Comm. No. 606/1994, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/54/D/606/1994 (1995).
161. Id. at ¶ 3.7.
162. Id.
163. Id. at ¶ 3.7, 3.8, 4.5.
164. Id. at ¶ 4.6.
165. Id. at ¶ 9.2.
166. Id. at ¶ 9.2.
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appropriate treatment of the illness and consideration for early
release. 167
A similar result occurred in another Jamaican case two years
later, Williams v. Jamaica. 168 There, however, mental instability
began as early as trial. 169 The defendant’s “mental condition
seriously deteriorated” during his confinement on death row, and
the government failed to carry out its commitment to conduct a
mental examination in prison. 170 Defense experts found that Mr.
Williams exhibited auditory hallucinations and paranoid
schizophrenia. 171 The Committee recommended an appropriate
remedy, particularly medical treatment. 172
Finally, in 2002, the Committee heard another case from the
Caribbean and found similar violations. In R.S. v. Trinidad and
Tobago, 173 defense counsel submitted an affidavit based on his
visits with his death-sentenced client, a psychiatrist’s visit, and
indications from a prison guard, that his client was “experiencing
auditory hallucinations and [was] probably suffering from severe
mental illness.” 174 In its conclusions, the Committee noted that
“the author’s mental state at the time of the reading of the death
warrant was obvious to those around him and should have been
apparent to the prison authorities.” 175 That is, his mental illness
was serious. The Committee took particular note of the fact that
the claim was one having to do with competence for execution and
not mental illness at the time of the offense or trial, and found that
issuance of a warrant for execution in such circumstances would
violate the prohibition on cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment
or punishment and called for his treatment or release. 176
167. Id. at ¶ 11.
168. Williams v. Jamaica, H.R. Comm. No. 609/1995, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/61/D/609/1995 (1997).
169. See id. at ¶ 2.3 (“Counsel indicates that at the time of the trial in
December 1988, the author already displayed signs of mental disturbance.”).
170. Id. at ¶ 6.5.
171. Id. at ¶ 2.4.
172. Id. at ¶ 8.
173. R.S. v. Trinidad & Tobago, H.R. Comm. No. 684/1996, U.N. Doc. 684/1996
(2002).
174. Id. at ¶ 2.3–2.6 (emphasis added).
175. Id. at ¶ 7.2.
176. Id. at ¶ 7.2, 9.
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Two brief examples of state practice are further illustrative of
the trend toward limitation of the death penalty as it is applied to
persons with serious mental illness. First, in 2012, the Eastern
Caribbean Court of Appeals vacated a death sentence against the
defendant and substituted manslaughter, where experts for the
prosecution and defense agreed that he “was suffering from an
abnormality of mind” sufficient to require the lesser, non-capital
penalty. 177 And finally, in Japan, in March 2014, a district court
released Iwao Hakamada, “who had been on death row since 1968
and developed mental illness as a result of the decades he had
spent in isolation.” 178 In each of these cases, it appears that the
illness was sufficiently severe to require mitigation of the death
penalty.
VI. Conclusion
The U.S. Supreme Court needs to more fully and specifically
define the range of severity of mental illness sufficient to bar the
carrying out of the death penalty. The “insanity” test of Ford v.
Wainright is not rigorous enough, and the jumbled conclusions of
Panetti v. Quarterman give little concrete guidance to the lower
courts in their determination of where to draw the line regarding
mental illness among those on death row. If anything, a standard
like that adopted by the Court in Hall v. Florida, which finds that
“intellectual disability is a condition, not a number” 179 can serve as
guidance to the courts with regard to mental illness as well. There
may be a range of conditions that satisfy the courts that the mental
illness in question mitigates capital punishment. This Article
suggests that the United Nations, regional human rights bodies,
and national courts alike have articulated tests, and provides a
range of options from which to choose.

177. Shorn Samuel v. The Queen, No. 22 of 2008 (E. Carib. Ct. App., 31 May
2012).
178. Referred to without further citation in the 2014 report of the Secretary
General to the U.N. General Assembly on the death penalty. UN
Secretary-General, H.R. Comm’n, Question of the Death Penalty, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/27/23, ¶ 62 (June 30, 2014).
179. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2001 (2014).
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Blackstone’s Commentaries notes the case of Edward Arnold,
who was found competent to stand trial and convicted for the
shooting of a British lord. 180 However, Blackstone concludes,
“being half a madman, [he] was never executed, but confined in
prison, where he died about thirty years after.” 181 In using the term
“half a madman,” Blackstone meant to distinguish Mr. Arnold from
the condemned person who is insane. Today, all of humanity has
no qualms in exempting the insane from the death penalty; such
has been the case in this country for the thirty years that have
passed since the decision in Ford v. Wainwright. Yet the
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment also should bar the
sentence of death for those who are “half-mad.” Surely the court
can fashion a remedy that recognizes that class of offender.

180. See generally Brief Amici Curiae of Legal Historians in Support of
Petitioner, Panetti v. Quarterman, No. 06-6407 (U.S., 2007), 2007 WL 579308, at
*10–11 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
208 (1st English ed. 1769)).
181. Id.

